Do colours look like dispositions?

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):238--45 (2001)
Dispositional theories of colour have been attacked by McGinn and others on the ground that ‘Colours do not look like dispositions’. Langsam has argued that on the contrary they do, in ‘Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 , pp. 68–75. I make three claims. First, neither side has made its case. Secondly, it is true, at least on one interpretation, that colours do not look like dispositions. Thirdly, this does not show that dispositionalism about colours is false
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DOI 10.2307/2660571
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Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2006). Color Primitivism. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Erkenntnis. Kluwer 73 - 105.
Daniel Stoljar (2007). Consequences of Intentionalism. Erkenntnis (Special Issue) 66 (1-2):247--70.

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