Hoffman's "proof" of the possibility of spectrum inversion

Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):48-50 (2006)
Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple mathematical result.
Keywords *Color  *Color Perception  *Conscious (Personality Factor)  *Logical Thinking  *Mathematical Modeling
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2006.02.003
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References found in this work BETA
David J. Chalmers (1999). Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.
Saul A. Kripke (1976). Is There a Problem About Substitutional Quantification? In Gareth Evans & John McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning. Oxford University Press 324-419.
Alex Byrne, Inverted Qualia. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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