David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Law and Philosophy 8 (2):151 - 200 (1989)
Kant's theory of punishment is commonly regarded as purely retributive in nature, and indeed much of his discourse seems to support that interpretation. Still, it leaves one with certain misgivings regarding the internal consistency of his position. Perhaps the problem lies not in Kant's inconsistency nor in the senility sometimes claimed to be apparent in the Metaphysic of Morals, but rather in a superimposed, modern yet monistic view of punishment. Historical considerations tend to show that Kant was discussing not one, but rather two facets of punishment, each independent but nevertheless mutually restrictive. Punishment as a threat was intended to deter crime. It was a tool in the hands of civil society to counteract human drives toward violating another's rights. In its execution, however, the state was limited in its reaction by a retributive theory of justice demanding respect for the individual as an end and not as a means to some further social goal. This interpretation of Kant's theory of punishment maintains consistency from the earliest through the latest of his writings on moral, legal, and political philosophy. It provides a good reason for rejecting current economic analyses of crime and punishment. Most important of all, it credits Kant's theory in its clear recognition of the ideals intrinsic to libertarian government.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Benjamin S. Yost (2010). Kant's Justification of the Death Penalty Reconsidered. Kantian Review 15 (2):1-27.
Michael Cholbi (2013). The Constitutive Approach to Kantian Rigorism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):439-448.
Kyla Ebels-Duggan (2012). Kant's Political Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 7 (12):896-909.
Ekow N. Yankah (2012). Crime, Freedom and Civic Bonds: Arthur Ripstein's Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (2):255-272.
Michael Clark (2004). A Non-Retributive Kantian Approach to Punishment. Ratio 17 (1):12–27.
Similar books and articles
Jane Johnson (2008). Revisiting Kantian Retributivism to Construct a Justification of Punishment. Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (3):291-307.
Merle J.-C. (2000). A Kantian Critique of Kant's Theory of Punishment. Law and Philosophy 19 (3):311-338.
Thom Brooks (2005). Kantian Punishment and Retributivism: A Reply to Clark. Ratio 18 (2):237–245.
Jean-Christophe Merle (2000). A Kantian Critique of Kant's Theory of Punishment. Law and Philosophy 19 (3):311 - 338.
Thom Brooks (2001). Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and Retribution. Philosophy 76 (4):561-580.
Attila Ataner (2006). Kant on Capital Punishment and Suicide. Kant-Studien 97 (4):452-482.
Douglas Lind (1994). Kant on Criminal Punishment. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:61-74.
Thom Brooks (2003). Kant's Theory of Punishment. Utilitas 15 (02):206-.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads226 ( #3,678 of 1,696,590 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #49,626 of 1,696,590 )
How can I increase my downloads?