David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 231--250 (2005)
Perceptual experiences justify beliefs—that much seems obvious. As Brewer puts it, “sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs” (this volume, xx). In Mind and World McDowell argues that we can get from this apparent platitude to the controversial claim that perceptual experiences have conceptual content: [W]e can coherently credit experiences with rational relations to judgement and belief, but only if we take it that spontaneity is already implicated in receptivity; that is, only if we take it that experiences have conceptual content. (1994, 162) Brewer agrees. Their view is sometimes called conceptualism; nonconceptualism is the rival position, that experiences have nonconceptual content. One initial obstacle is understanding what the issue is. What is conceptual content, and how is it different from nonconceptual content? Section 1 of this paper explains two versions of each of the rival positions: state (non)conceptualism and content (non)conceptualism; the latter pair is the locus of the relevant dispute. Two prominent arguments for content nonconceptualism—the richness argument and the continuity argument—both fail (section 2). McDowell’s and Brewer’s epistemological defenses of content conceptualism are also faulty (section 3). Section 4 gives a more simple-minded case for conceptualism; finally, some reasons are given for rejecting the claim—on one natural interpretation—that experiences justify beliefs
|Keywords||Conceptualism Content Perception|
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Dustin Stokes (2013). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
Matthew Boyle (2016). Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4).
Alex Byrne (2016). The Epistemic Significance of Experience. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):947-967.
Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading. Mind and Language 24 (2):235-252.
Nicholas Silins (2013). The Significance of High-Level Content. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.
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