Transparency, Belief, Intention

Abstract
This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions
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    References found in this work BETA
    Matthew Boyle (2009). Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
    Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
    Michael Bratman (1984). Two Faces of Intention. Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
    Anthony Brueckner (1998). Moore Inferences. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):366-369.

    View all 27 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Matthew Boyle (2011). Transparent Self-Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241.
    Sarah K. Paul (2012). How We Know What We Intend. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
    Markos Valaris (2011). Transparency as Inference: Reply to Alex Byrne. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):319-324.
    Similar books and articles
    Markos Valaris (2011). Transparency as Inference: Reply to Alex Byrne. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):319-324.
    Kieran Setiya (2011). Knowledge of Intention. In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press. 170--197.
    Quassim Cassam (2011). Knowing What You Believe. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):1-23.
    Nicholas Silins (2012). Judgment as a Guide to Belief. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief. In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Pascal Engel (2010). Self-Ascriptions of Belief and Transparency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610.
    Julie Germein (2012). Two Objections to Moran's Transparency Account. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):735-740.
    Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
    Raimo Tuomela (2005). We-Intentions Revisited. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
    Sarah K. Paul (2012). How We Know What We Intend. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
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