Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):160-176 (2010)
|Abstract||In chapter 9 of De Interpretatione, Aristotle offers a defense of free will against the threat of fatalism. According to the traditional interpretation, Aristotle concedes the validity of the fatalist's arguments and then proceeds to reject the Principle of Bivalence in order to avoid the fatalist's conclusion. Assuming that the traditional interpretation is right on this point, it remains to be seen why Aristotle felt compelled to reject such an intuitive semantic principle rather than challenge the fatalist's inference from truth to necessity. The answer, I contend, lies in Aristotle's theory of truth and truthmakers|
|Keywords||Aristotle Future Contingents Bivalence Fatalism Truth Truthmakers Sea Battle De Interpretatione|
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