David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Techne 12 (1):36-47 (2008)
In this paper, I argue that Stanley and Williamson’s 2001 account of knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-that is wrong. They argue that a claim such as “Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle” is true if and only if Hannah has some relevant knowledge-that. I challenge their claim by considering the case of a famous amnesic patient named Henry M. who is capable of acquiring and retaining new knowledge-how but who is incapable of acquiring and retaining new knowledge-that. In the first two sections of the paper, I introduce the topic of knowledge-how and give a brief overview of Stanley and Williamson’s position. In the third and fourth sections, I discuss the case of Henry M. and explain why it is plausible to describe him as someone who can retain new knowledge-how but not new knowledge-that. In the final sections of the paper, I argue that Henry M.’s case does indeed provide a counterexample to Stanley and Williamson’s analysis of knowing-how as a species of knowing-that, and I consider and respond to possible objections to my argument
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Per Norström (2015). Knowing How, Knowing That, Knowing Technology. Philosophy and Technology 28 (4):553-565.
Ephraim Glick (2011). Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):398-434.
Similar books and articles
Ellen Fridland (2015). Knowing‐How: Problems and Considerations. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):703-727.
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2011). Linguistic Know-How: The Limits of Intellectualism. Theoria 77 (1):71-86.
Eva-Maria Jung & Albert Newen (2010). Knowledge and Abilities: The Need for a New Understanding of Knowing-How. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):113-131.
Ted Poston (2009). Know How to Be Gettiered? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743 - 747.
Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Jeremy Fantl (2008). Knowing-How and Knowing-That. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
Christos Douskos (2013). The Linguistic Argument for Intellectualism. Synthese 190 (12):2325-2340.
Elia Zardini (2013). Knowledge-How, True Indexical Belief, and Action. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):341-355.
Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Knowledge-How: A Unified Account. In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press
Charles Wallis (2008). Consciousness, Context, and Know-How. Synthese 160 (1):123 - 153.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2005). Williamson on Knowledge, Action, and Causation. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):15-28.
Tobias Rosefeldt (2004). Is Knowing-How Simply a Case of Knowing-That? Philosophical Investigations 27 (4):370–379.
Gregor Damschen (2009). Dispositional Knowledge-How Versus Propositional Knowledge-That. In Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stueber (eds.), Debating Dispositions. Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. De Gruyter
Refeng Tang (2011). Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads29 ( #107,384 of 1,725,989 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #55,471 of 1,725,989 )
How can I increase my downloads?