David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Religious Studies 40 (4):437-456 (2004)
According to the free-will defence, the exercise of free will by creatures is of such value that God is willing to allow the existence of evil which comes from the misuse of free will. A well-known objection holds that the exercise of free will is compatible with determinism and thus, if God exists, God could have predetermined exactly how the will would be exercised; God could even have predetermined that free will would be exercised sinlessly. Thus, it is held, the free-will defence cannot be used as a partial account of why God should have allowed evil to exist. I investigate this objection using Kripke's apparatus for treating modalities and natural kinds to explore the nature of the incompatibilism required by the free-will defence. I show why the objection fails even if the standard arguments for compatibilism are acceptable. This is because the modality involved in the incompatibilism needed by the free-will defence differs from the modality involved in the compatibilism that is supported by standard compatibilist arguments. Finally, an argument is sketched for a variety of incompatibilism of the kind needed by the free-will defence.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Frank J. Murphy (1995). The Problem of Evil and a Plausible Defence. Religious Studies 31 (2):243 - 250.
David Basinger (1982). Anderson on Plantinga. Philosophy Research Archives 8:315-320.
W. S. Anglin (1990). Free Will and the Christian Faith. Oxford University Press.
Richard M. Gale (1990). Freedom and the Free Will Defense. Social Theory and Practice 16 (3):397-423.
Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Wes Morriston (2003). Are Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection Compatible? Reply to Mawson. Religious Studies 39 (4):441-449.
Patrick Francken (1993). Incompatibilism, Nondeterministic Causation, and the Real Problem of Free Will. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:37-63.
Andrew Eshleman (1997). Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence. Religious Studies 33 (3):267-286.
A. A. Howsepian (2007). Compatibilism, Evil, and the Free-Will Defense. Sophia 46 (3):217-236.
T. J. Mawson (2004). The Possibility of a Free-Will Defence for the Problem of Natural Evil. Religious Studies 40 (1):23-42.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads259 ( #1,397 of 1,098,977 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #22,413 of 1,098,977 )
How can I increase my downloads?