Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):401 – 404 (1995)
|Abstract||Suppose we wish to decide which of a pair of actions has better consequences in a case in which both actions result in infinite utility. Peter Vallentyne and others have proposed that one action has better consequences than a second if there is a time after which the cumulative utility of the first action always outstrips the cumulative utility of the second. I argue against this principle, in particular I show how cases may arise in which up to any point of time action a1 produces more utility than action a2, yet for each individual involved a2 produces more utility|
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