The Hume-Edwards Principle

Religious Studies 31 (3):323 - 328 (1995)
The Leibniz-Clarke version of the cosmological argument allows for the possibility that there might be a beginningless succession of objects, each produced by earlier objects in the succession, but it is held that a causal question would then arise as to what brought this whole succession of objects into being. This line of thought is commonly said to be confused and an appeal is made to a principle that if a causal explanation has been provided for each member of a sequence, then the sequence as a whole has been causally explained. We argue that this proposed principle is unwarranted.
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    James Franklin (1980). More on Part IX of Hume's Dialogues. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (118):69-71.
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