a phenomenological framework for neuroscience?

Gestalt Theory 28 (1-2):109-122 (2006)
This paper tries to sketch what phenomenological constraints for Neurosciences would be looking like. It maintains that such an adequate phenomenological description as that provided by Gestalt psychology is a condition for the Neurosciences to account for every-day experience opf the world. The explanatory gap in Cognitive sciences is discussed with reference to Jackendoff, Prinz, and Köhler.
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PhilPapers Archive Carmelo Calì, a phenomenological framework for neuroscience?
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