Behavioral algebraization of logics

Studia Logica 91 (1):63 - 111 (2009)
We introduce and study a new approach to the theory of abstract algebraic logic (AAL) that explores the use of many-sorted behavioral logic in the role traditionally played by unsorted equational logic. Our aim is to extend the range of applicability of AAL toward providing a meaningful algebraic counterpart also to logics with a many-sorted language, and possibly including non-truth-functional connectives. The proposed behavioral approach covers logics which are not algebraizable according to the standard approach, while also bringing a new algebraic perspective to logics which are algebraizable using the standard tools of AAL. Furthermore, we pave the way toward a robust behavioral theory of AAL, namely by providing a behavioral version of the Leibniz operator which allows us to generalize the traditional Leibniz hierarchy, as well as several well-known characterization results. A number of meaningful examples will be used to illustrate the novelties and advantages of the approach.
Keywords Abstract algebraic logic  many-sorted behavioral logic  non-truth-functionality
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References found in this work BETA
Newton C. A. Da Costa (1974). On the Theory of Inconsistent Formal Systems. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15 (4):497-510.

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