husserl and the phenomenological description of imagery: some issues for the cognitive sciences?

ARHE 2 (4):25-37 (2005)
This paper deals with two theories Husserl worked out on imagery in order to see if the properties a phenomenological description ascribes to imagery are fit to give meaningful constraints upon theoretical models that guide empirical research. Husserlian descriptions and Kosslyn and colleagues models are hence compared as to their explanatory strategy and implications.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Carmelo Calì, husserl and the phenomenological description of imagery: some issues for the cognitive sciences?
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Evan Thompson (2007). Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.
Nigel J. T. Thomas (2003). The False Dichotomy of Imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):211-211.
Peter P. Slezak (2002). The Imagery Debate: Déjà-Vu All Over Again? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):209-210.
Kim Sterelny (1986). The Imagery Debate. Philosophy of Science 53 (December):560-83.
Danielle Lories (2006). Remarks on Aesthetic Intentionality: Husserl or Kant. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (1):31 – 49.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

190 ( #9,813 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

22 ( #39,230 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.