Justice, care, gender bias

Journal of Philosophy 85 (9):451-463 (1988)
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Abstract

I address the question of gender bias in ethical theorizing, in particular the claim that an "ethics of justice" is gender biased because it cannot logically accommodate an "ethics of care." I argue against the strong claim that an ethics of justice and an ethics of care are incompatible but suggest that theorizing that crystallizes into a tradition has non-logical as well as logical implications. In order to explain why ethical theorizing has focused on some content and neglected others, one would have to suppose tacit general acceptance of a set of beliefs. It is in considering those beliefs that the charge of gender bias in ethical theorizing might be made to stick.

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Cheshire Calhoun
Arizona State University

Citations of this work

Medicalization and epistemic injustice.Alistair Wardrope - 2015 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 18 (3):341-352.
An unconnected Heap of duties?David McNaughton - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):433-447.
Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics.Raja Halwani - 2003 - Hypatia 18 (3):161-192.

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