Making Sense of Doubt: Strawson's Anti-Scepticism

Theoria 77 (3):261-278 (2011)
Abstract
Strawson's philosophical attitude towards scepticism is frequently thought to have undergone a significant shift from the “strong” or “robust” employment of transcendental arguments in Individuals to a more “modest” understanding of the efficacy of such arguments in Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. I argue that this interpretation is based upon a misunderstanding of the function of transcendental arguments in Strawson's earlier works. Examining the continuity of Strawson's modest naturalistic approach to scepticism can offer some insight as to the continuing overestimation of the anti-sceptical efficacy of transcendental arguments
Keywords transcendental arguments  knowledge  scepticism  Strawson  conceptual scheme
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References found in this work BETA
John J. Callanan (2006). Kant's Transcendental Strategy. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):360–381.

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