Environmental Ethics 12 (2):99-124 (1990)
|Abstract||Despite Christopher Stone’s recent argument on behalf of moral pluralism, the principal architects of environmental ethics remain committed to moral monism. Moral pluralism fails to specify what to do when two or more of its theories indicate inconsistent practical imperatives. More deeply, ethical theories are embedded in moral philosophies and moral pluralism requires us to shift between mutually inconsistent metaphysics of morals, most of which are no Ionger tenable in light of postmodern science. A univocal moral philosophy-traceable to David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s theory of moral sentiments, grounded in evolutionary biology by Charles Darwin, and latterly extended to the environment by Aldo Leopold-provides a unified, scientifically supported world view and portrait of human nature in whichmultiple, lexically ordered ethics are generated by multiple human, “mixed,” and “biotic” community memberships|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Eva Erman (2007). Conflict and Universal Moral Theory: From Reasonableness to Reason-Giving. Political Theory 35 (5):598 - 623.
Ragnar Francén (2010). Moral Motivation Pluralism. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
Noriaki Iwasa (2011). Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (33):323-352.
Michael B. Gill & Shaun Nichols (2008). Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):143-163.
Andrew Light (1996). Callicott and Naess on Pluralism. Inquiry 39 (2):273 – 294.
Robert B. Talisse (2011). Value Pluralism and Liberal Politics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):87-100.
Gary E. Varner (1991). No Holism Without Pluralism. Environmental Ethics 13 (2):175-179.
J. Baird Callicott (1994). Moral Monism in Environmental Ethics Defended. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:51-60.
Peter S. Wenz (1993). Minimal, Moderate, and Extreme Moral Pluralism. Environmental Ethics 15 (1):61-74.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #64,458 of 550,917 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,807 of 550,917 )
How can I increase my downloads?