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- Benjamin Callard (2007). The Conceivability of Platonism. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (3).It is widely believed that platonists face a formidable problem: that of providing an intelligible account of mathematical knowledge. The problem is that we seem unable, if the platonist is right, to have the causal relationships with the objects of mathematics without which knowledge of these objects seems unintelligible. The standard platonist response to this challenge is either to deny that knowledge without causation is unintelligible, or to make room for causal interactions by softening the platonism at issue. In this essay I argue that the idea of causal relations with fully platonist objects is unproblematic. I would like to thank Agnes Gellen Callard, Josh Sheptow, and Palle Yourgrau for helpful discussions of the ideas presented here.Reading list | Discuss | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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| | Scholar | At my library | Share & More ... Book Information Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism. Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism Colin Cheyne , Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 2001 , xvi + 236 , £55 ( cloth ) By Colin Cheyne. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Pp. xvi + 236. £55.
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