David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 120 (1):19-26 (1999)
My object is to question a recurrent claim made to the point that Thomas Reid (1710–1796) was hostile to ether theories and that this hostility had its source in his distinctive interpretation of the first of Newton's regulæ philosophandi. Against this view I will argue that Reid did not have any quarrel at all with unobservable or theoretical entities as such, and that his objections against actual theories concerning ether were scientific rather than philosophical, even when based on Newton's first rule. I argue further that Reid's insistence on Newton's rule concerns, not direct observation, but rather the notion of explanation itself.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Aaron D. Cobb (2010). Natural Philosophy and the Use of Causal Terminology: A Puzzle in Reid's Account of Natural Philosophy. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (2):101-114.
Robert Callergård (2005). Reid and the Newtonian Forces of Attraction. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3 (2):139-155.
Similar books and articles
Rebecca Copenhaver (2006). Thomas Reid's Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness and Intentionality. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):279-289.
Rebecca Copenhaver (2007). Reid on Consciousness: Hop, Hot or For? Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):613-634.
Philip E. B. Jourdain (1915). Newton's Hypotheses of Ether and of Gravitation From 1672 to 1679. The Monist 25 (1):79-106.
Philip E. B. Jourdain (1915). Newton's Hypotheses of Ether and of Gravitation From 1679 to 1693. The Monist 25 (2):234-254.
Todd Buras (2002). The Problem with Reid's Direct Realism. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):457-477.
Nicholas Wolterstorff (2006). What Sort of Epistemological Realist Was Thomas Reid? Journal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (2):111-124.
Quayshawn Spencer (2004). Do Newton's Rules of Reasoning Guarantee Truth ... Must They? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 35 (4):759-782.
John Greco (2002). How to Reid Moore. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):544-563.
J. E. McGuire (1970). Atoms and the 'Analogy of Nature': Newton's Third Rule of Philosophizing. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 1 (1):3-58.
David Marshall Miller (2009). Qualities, Properties, and Laws in Newton's Induction. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):1052-1063.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #252,662 of 1,934,424 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #434,207 of 1,934,424 )
How can I increase my downloads?