Erkenntnis 58 (2):261-266 (2003)
|Abstract||I argue that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument cannot succeed in showing that qualia are epiphenomenal. The reason for this is that there is, given the structure of the argument, an irreconcilable tension between his support for the claim that qualia are non-physical and his conclusion that they are epiphenomenal. The source of the tension is that his argument for the non-physical character of qualia is plausible only on the assumption that they have causal efficacy, while his argument for the epiphenomenal character of qualia is plausible only on the assumption that they are non-physical. Since these two arguments cannot be combined coherently, the most Jackson's argument can establish is that qualia are non-physical|
|Keywords||Epiphenomenalism Knowledge Metaphysics Qualia Jackson, F|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Torin Alter, The Knowledge Argument. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2009). Still Epiphenomenal Qualia: Response to Muller. Philosophia 37 (1):105-107.
Brie Gertler (2005). The Knowledge Argument. In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. MacMillan.
John C. Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (2006). Re-Acquaintance with Qualia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):353 – 378.
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
William S. Robinson (2002). Jackson's Apostasy. Philosophical Studies 111 (3):277-293.
Yujin Nagasawa (2010). The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 72 (1):37 - 56.
G. Furash (1989). Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument Against Materialism. Dialogue 32 (October):1-6.
Neil Campbell (2012). Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument. Erkenntnis 76 (1):137-145.
Fredrik Stjernberg, Not so Epiphenomenal Qualia. Spinning Ideas.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads70 ( #12,665 of 556,808 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #9,636 of 556,808 )
How can I increase my downloads?