Anomalous monism and the charge of epiphenomenalism
Dialectica 52 (1):23-39 (1998)
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| Keywords | Causation Epiphenomenalism Epistemology Mental States Monism | |||||||||
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Neil Campbell (1997). The Standard Objection to Anomalous Monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):373-82.
Ted Honderich (1982). The Argument for Anomalous Monism. Analysis 42 (January):59-64.
Brian P. McLaughlin (1989). Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical. Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135.
Peter Smith (1984). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism: A Reply to Honderich. Analysis 44 (2):83-86.
Neil Campbell (2005). Explanatory Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.
Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (1992). Mental Events Again--Or What is Wrong with Anomalous Monism? Erkenntnis 36 (3):345-373.
Norman P. Melchert (1986). What's Wrong with Anomalous Monism. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):265-74.
Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
Rex Welshon (1999). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.
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