Canadian Journal Of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406 (2005)
|Abstract||_If you were free in doing something and morally responsible for it, you could have done otherwise. That_ _has seemed a pretty firm proposition among the old, new, clear, unclear and other propositions in the_ _philosophical discussion of freedom and determinism. If you were free in what you did, there was an_ _alternative. It is also at least natural to think that if determinism is true, you can never do otherwise than_ _you do. G. E. Moore, that Cambridge reasoner in whose shadow Wittgenstein ought to be standing,_ _considered the matter. He pointed out that even if determinism is true, there remains a sense in which you_ _can still do otherwise than you do: you will do otherwise if you so choose. That, on reflection, is consistent_ _with determinism. The doctrine of the compatibility of freedom and determinism is saved. Joseph Keim_ _Campbell, strong philosopher at Washington State University, provides the latest thinking on this seemingly_ _unavoidable dispute. You do not have to agree that either compatibilism or incompatibilism must be true in_ _order to appreciate the carefulness of his reasoning in this piece of ongoing American philosophy. It_ _requires and repays attention._|
|Keywords||Ability Compatibilism Determinism Ethics Free Will Generalization Moral Responsibility|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Galen Strawson (1989). Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism. Inquiry 32 (March):3-27.
Tomis Kapitan (2002). A Master Argument for Incompatibilism? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Göran Duus-Otterström (2008). Betting Against Hard Determinism. Res Publica 14 (3).
Manuel Vargas (2010). The Revisionist Turn: A Brief History of Recent Work on Free Will. In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave.
Noa Latham (2004). Determinism, Randomness, and Value. Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):153-167.
Jeremy Randel Koons (2002). Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism? Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.
Peter van Inwagen (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads81 ( #9,452 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?