Causal analyses of seeing

Erkenntnis 56 (2):169-180 (2002)
Abstract
I critically analyse two causal analyses of seeing, by Frank Jackson and Michael Tye. I show that both are unacceptable. I argue that Jackson's analysis fails because it does not rule out cases of non-seeing. Tye's analysis seems to be superior to Jackson's in this respect, but I show that it too lets in cases of non-seeing. I also show that Tye's proposed solution to a problem for his theory -- which involves a robot that mimics another (unseen) robot -- fails. Finally I show that his 'variability' requirement is not necessary, because there are cases where someone can see an object even though the variability that Tye requires does not exist
Keywords Analysis  Causal  Metaphysics  Seeing  Jackson, F  Tye, M
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    Scott Campbell (2006). The Potential Information Analysis of Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):102–123.
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