|Abstract||The thesis that composition is identity (CAI) is the thesis that the Xs compose A iff the Xs is identical to A.1 If this thesis is to be compatible with any mereological view other than mereological nihilism, we must allow that many-one identity statements make sense: that is, that it makes sense to say of a plurality of things that they are (collectively) identical to some one thing. Identity, on this view, holds between every thing and itself, but can also between a thing and some things.|
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