Contextualism, metaphor, and what is said

Mind and Language 21 (3):280–309 (2006)
Abstract
On a familiar and prima facie plausible view of metaphor, speakers who speak metaphorically say one thing in order to mean another. A variety of theorists have recently challenged this view; they offer criteria for distinguishing what is said from what is merely meant, and argue that these support classifying metaphor within 'what is said'. I consider four such criteria, and argue that when properly understood, they support the traditional classification instead. I conclude by sketching how we might extract a workable notion of 'what is said' from ordinary intuitions about saying.
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Josef Stern (2011). Metaphor and Minimalism. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):273 - 298.
    Andreas Stokke (2013). Protagonist Projection. Mind and Language 28 (2):204-232.
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