How to have a radically minimal ontology

Philosophical Studies 151 (2):249 - 264 (2010)
Abstract
In this paper I further elucidate and defend a metaontological position that allows you to have a minimal ontology without embracing an error-theory of ordinary talk. On this view 'there are Fs' can be strictly and literally true without bringing an ontological commitment to Fs. Instead of a sentence S committing you to the things that must be amongst the values of the variables if it is true, I argue that S commits you to the things that must exist as truthmakers for S if it is true. I rebut some recent objections that have been levelled against this metaontological view
Keywords Ontological commitment  Compositional nihilism  Musical nihilism
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Truthmaker Commitments. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.
Jerrold Levinson (1980). What a Musical Work Is. Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):5-28.
Agustín Rayo (2007). Ontological Commitment. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):428–444.

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Citations of this work BETA
Elizabeth Barnes (2014). Fundamental Indeterminacy. Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):339-362.
A. J. Cotnoir (2013). Parts as Counterparts. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):228-241.

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