John Passmore and Hume's Moral Philosophy

Hume Studies 11 (2):109-124 (1985)
Abstract
This paper identifies passmore's interpretation of hume as having skeptical principles so powerful that they should issue in a complete irrationalist which he did not embrace. The idea of such an inconsistency within hume's philosophy is then applied to his theory of morals. The way of ideas, Pessimistic rationalism, And the theory of association should issue in moral skepticism. Instead, Hume equivocates between subjectivist and realist views of the relation between morality and our pleasure or pain in contemplation of actions
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