Abstract

In this thesis I focus attention on views about the nature of morally good persons and actions which are associated with the Kantian tradition in ethics. After a short introductory chapter, Chapter II outlines the Kantian view that morally good persons are motivated by a sense of duty, not by inclination. I try to explain why many people have found this view problematic and in need of defence. In Chapter III, I try to explain the view that morally good persons are motivated by reason, not by desire. I try to show that this view is distinct from the view outlined in Chapter II and I consider attempts by authors like John McDowell, Thomas Nagel and Colin McGinn to show that we can be motivated by reason. In Chapter IV I critically examine arguments which Kantians use, or might use, to defend the views on moral worth set out in Chapters II and III. Then, in Chapter V, I consider how the views of Philippa Foot on the nature of moral reasons might be construed as an attack on the Kantian view of moral worth and I try to show how Kantians might try to defuse this attack. Chapters VI and VII examine the views put forth by Thomas Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism. I devote this space to a discussion of Nagel's views partly because Chapter IV assumes that the main thesis of Nagel's book cannot be defended but also because Nagel's defence of a Kantian conception of moral psychology is of considerable interest in itself