Lewisian realism: Methodology, epistemology, and circularity

Synthese 156 (1):143 - 159 (2007)
In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall victim to the objection I lay against Lewis.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Benacerraf (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sam Cowling (2013). Ideological Parsimony. Synthese 190 (17):3889-3908.
Ross P. Cameron (2010). The Grounds of Necessity. Philosophy Compass 5 (4):348-358.

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