Metaphor and that certain 'je ne sais quoi'

Philosophical Studies 129 (1):1 - 25 (2006)
Philosophers have traditionally inclined toward one of two opposite extremes when it comes to metaphor. On the one hand, partisans of metaphor have tended to believe that metaphors do something different in kind from literal utterances; it is a ‘heresy’, they think, either to deny that what metaphors do is genuinely cognitive, or to assume that it can be translated into literal terms. On the other hand, analytic philosophers have typically denied just this: they tend to assume that if metaphors express any genuine content at all, then that content can in principle be paraphrased into literal terms. They often conclude on this basis that metaphor is theoretically dispensable, and so that it poses no special challenges and affords no distinctive insights for the philosophy of language and mind
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.2307/4321747
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Elisabeth Camp (2013). Slurring Perspectives. Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):330-349.
Elisabeth Camp (2007). Thinking with Maps. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):145–182.

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