Moral Reasoning on the Ground

Ethics 122 (2):273-312 (2012)
We present a unified empirical and philosophical account of moral consistency reasoning, a distinctive form of moral reasoning that exposes inconsistencies among moral judgments about concrete cases. Judgments opposed in belief or in emotion and motivation are inconsistent when the cases are similar in morally relevant respects. Moral consistency reasoning, we argue, regularly shapes moral thought and feeling by coordinating two systems described in dual process models of moral cognition. Our empirical explanation of moral change fills a gap in the empirical literature, making psychologically plausible a defensible new model of justified moral change and a hybrid theory of moral judgment.
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DOI 10.1086/663980
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Victor Kumar (2015). Moral Judgment as a Natural Kind. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.

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