Methodological suggestions from a comparative psychology of knowledge processes

Inquiry 2 (1-4):152 – 182 (1959)
Introductory Abstract Philosophers of science, in the course of making a sharp distinction between the tasks of the philosopher and those of the scientist, have pointed to the possibility of an empirical science of induction. A comparative psychology of knowledge processes is offered as one aspect of this potential enterprise. From fragments of such a psychology, methodological suggestions are drawn relevant to several chronic problems in the social sciences, including the publication of negative results from novel explorations, the operational diagnosis of dispositions, the status of aggregates of persons as social entities, and the validation of psychological tests
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    Brian D. Haig (1987). Scientific Problems and the Conduct of Research. Educational Philosophy and Theory 19 (2):22–32.
    Brian S. Baigrie (1989). Natural Selection Vs Trial and Error Elimination. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (2):157 – 172.
    D. J. Corson (1990). Old and New Conceptions of Discovery in Education. Educational Philosophy and Theory 22 (2):26–49.

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