On the distinction between Peirce's abduction and Lipton's Inference to the best explanation

Synthese 180 (3):419 - 442 (2011)
Abstract
I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation (IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peireean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peireean abduction and IBE in accounting for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification—not justification—of types of scientific reasoning. In particular, I claim that Peireean abduction is an in-depth account of the process of generating explanatory hypotheses, while IBE, at least in Peter Lipton's thorough treatment, is a more encompassing account of the processes both of generating and of evaluating scientific hypotheses. There is then a two-fold problem with the claim that abduction is IBE. On the one hand, it conflates abduction and induction, which are two distinct forms of logical inference, with two distinct aims, as shown by Charles S. Peirce; on the other hand it lacks a clear sense of the full scope of IBE as an account of scientific inference
Keywords Abduction  Charles Sanders Peirce
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References found in this work BETA
Douglas R. Anderson (1986). The Evolution of Peirce's Concept of Abduction. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 22 (2):145 - 164.
Arthur W. Burks (1946). Peirce's Theory of Abduction. Philosophy of Science 13 (4):301-306.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1958). Peirce's Notion of Abduction. Journal of Philosophy 55 (14):593-597.

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Citations of this work BETA
Moti Mizrahi (2012). Why the Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism Ultimately Fails. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):132-138.
Tjerk Gauderis (2014). To Envision a New Particle or Change an Existing Law? Hypothesis Formation and Anomaly Resolution for the Curious Case of the Β Decay Spectrum. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 45:27-45.
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