Philosophical Studies 104 (3):253-67 (2001)
|Abstract||I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion of personalidentity entails that a person is not an object, but a series ofpsychological events. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive,I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to theway that substances exist. I develop ten criteria that such a`quasi-substance' should meet, and I argue that a reasonablecase can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a person meets these criteria|
|Keywords||Metaphysics Person Personal Identity Substance Shoemaker, S Snowden, P|
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