Quine on Cognitive Meaning and Normative Ethics

Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):1-11 (1996)
Owen Flanagan has recently argued for the claim that "the overall spirit--of Quine's philosophy warrants [a]--robust, realistic, and cognitivist picture of ethics." I believe that Flanagan's interpretation of Quine's philosophy is mistaken. Specifically, I argue that the overall spirit of Quine's philosophy, especially his treatment of cognitive meaning, warrants a noncognitivist and thus antirealist account of normative ethics My argument helps explain what Quine means when he wrote that ethics is methodologically infirm as compared to science
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00773.x
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W. V. Quine (1979). Cognitive Meaning. The Monist 62 (2):129-142.
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