Seeing objects and surfaces, and the 'in virtue of' relation

Philosophy 79 (309):393-402 (2004)
Abstract
Frank Jackson in Perception uses the relation to ground the distinction between direct and indirect perception. He argues that it follows that our perception of physical objects is mediated by perceiving their facing surfaces, and so is indirect. I argue that this is false. Seeing a part of an object is in itself a seeing of the object; there is no indirectness involved. Hence, the relation is an inadequate basis for the direct-indirect distinction. I also argue that claims that we don't, , see objects, are also false
Keywords Epistemology  Object  Perception  Surface  Jackson, F
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Scott Campbell (2006). The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):339–358.
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