Searle on strong AI
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):103-8 (1990)
| Abstract | This Article does not have an abstract | |||||||||
| Keywords | Artificial Intelligence Cognition Intentionality Metaphysics Searle, J | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Larry Hauser, Searle's Chinese Room Argument. Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
Andrew Melnyk (1996). Searle's Abstract Argument Against Strong AI. Synthese 108 (3):391-419.
John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.) (2002). Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
J. M. Whitmer (1983). Intentionality, Artificial Intelligence, and the Causal Powers of the Brain. Auslegung 10:194-210.
John Mark Bishop (2003). Dancing with Pixies: Strong Artificial Intelligence and Panpsychism. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
Christopher A. Fields (1984). Double on Searle's Chinese Room. Nature and System 6 (March):51-54.
Asher Seidel (1988). Searle on the Biological Basis of Cognition. Analysis 48 (January):26-28.
Georges Rey (2003). Searle's Misunderstandings of Functionalism and Strong AI. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
Karl Pfeifer (1992). Searle, Strong AI, and Two Ways of Sorting Cucumbers. Journal of Philosophical Research 17:347-50.
Dale Jacquette (1990). Fear and Loathing (and Other Intentional States) in Searle's Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):287-304.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads45 ( #24,555 of 549,122 )Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,263 of 549,122 )How can I increase my downloads? |

