Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 164 (2):261 - 280 (2008)
|Abstract||This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form or . In Sect. 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 21 criticise Armstrong's account of truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 31 examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. In Sect. 41 discuss, and dismiss, a theistic account of the source of modal truth proposed by Alexander Pruss. In Sect. 5 I offer a means of (dis)solving the problem|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
David Armstrong (2003). Truthmakers for Modal Truths. In Hallvard Lillehammer Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (ed.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. Routledge.
John Heil (2006). The Legacy of Linguisticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):233 – 244.
D. M. Armstrong (2007). Truthmakers for Negative Truths, and for Truths of Mere Possibility. In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmakers. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
Ross P. Cameron (2010). Necessity and Triviality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):401-415.
Ross P. Cameron (2008). How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
Timothy Pawl (2010). The Possibility Principle and the Truthmakers for Modal Truths. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):417-428.
Ross Paul Cameron (2008). Truthmakers and Necessary Connections. Synthese 161 (1):27-45.
Gabriele Contessa (2010). Modal Truthmakers and Two Varieties of Actualism. Synthese 174 (3):341 - 353.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads93 ( #9,109 of 738,608 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #17,197 of 738,608 )
How can I increase my downloads?