Truthmakers and necessary connections

Synthese 161 (1):27-45 (2008)
Abstract
In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis’ ‘Things-qua-truthmakers’ theory which attempts to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3–5 I discuss various formulations of the denial of necessary connections and argue that each of them is either false or compatible with truthmaker theory. In Sect. 6 I show how the truthmaker theorist can resist the charge that they are committed to necessary exclusions between possible existents. I conclude that there is no good objection to truthmaker theory on the grounds that it violates the Humean dictum.
Keywords Truthmakers  Necessary connections  Lewis
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References found in this work BETA
Max Black (1954/1971). Problems of Analysis. Westport, Conn.,Greenwood Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Einar Duenger Bohn (2009). Must There Be a Top Level? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):193-201.
Mark Jago (2011). Setting the Facts Straight. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):33-54.

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