Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble

Philosophical Studies 140 (1):1 - 18 (2008)
What are the ontological commitments of a sentence? In this paper I offer an answer from the perspective of the truthmaker theorist that contrasts with the familiar Quinean criterion. I detail some of the benefits of thinking of things this way: they include making the composition debate tractable without appealing to a neo-Carnapian metaontology, making sense of neo-Fregeanism, and dispensing with some otherwise recalcitrant necessary connections
Keywords Ontological Commitment  Fundamentality  Metaontology  Composition  Neo-Fregeanism
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DOI 10.2307/27734277
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D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.

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