Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble
Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 140 (1):1 - 18 (2008)
|Abstract||What are the ontological commitments of a sentence? In this paper I offer an answer from the perspective of the truthmaker theorist that contrasts with the familiar Quinean criterion. I detail some of the benefits of thinking of things this way: they include making the composition debate tractable without appealing to a neo-Carnapian metaontology, making sense of neo-Fregeanism, and dispensing with some otherwise recalcitrant necessary connections|
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