Turtles all the way down: Regress, priority and fundamentality

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):1-14 (2008)
Abstract
I address an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss applications of this intuition with reference to Bradley’s regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intui- tion, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, and discussing the ramifications of giving the justification I think best.
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References found in this work BETA
Kit Fine (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
C. S. Jenkins (2005). Realism and Independence. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (3):199 - 209.
Citations of this work BETA
Karen Bennett (2011). By Our Bootstraps. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):27-41.
Kerry McKenzie (2011). Arguing Against Fundamentality. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 42 (4):244-255.

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