The conception of a person as a series of mental events

Abstract
It is argued that those who accept the psychological criterion of personal identity, such as Parfit and Shoemaker, should accept what I call the 'series' view of a person, according to which a person is a unified aggregate of mental events and states. As well as defending this view against objections, I argue that it allows the psychological theorist to avoid the two lives objection which the 'animalist' theorists have raised against it, an objection which causes great difficulties for the conception of a person that most psychological theorists favour, the constitution view. It is also argued that the series view allows that people can body swap and teleport, which the constitution view—which takes a person to be a physical object (but a distinct physical object from the human being)—has great trouble with
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,802
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What Am I? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151 - 159.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What Am I? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151-159.
Scott Campbell (2000). Could Your Life Have Been Different? American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):37 - 50.

View all 47 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Sydney Shoemaker (1999). Self and Body: Sydney Shoemaker. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):287–306.
Sydney Shoemaker (1999). Self, Body, and Coincidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (73):287-306.
Eric T. Olson (1997). Was I Ever a Fetus? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):95-110.
Scott Campbell (2001). Persons and Substances. Philosophical Studies 104 (3):253-67.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

182 ( #3,804 of 1,099,750 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

15 ( #14,384 of 1,099,750 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.