The Grounds of Necessity

Philosophy Compass 5 (4):348-358 (2010)
Some truths are necessary, others could have been false. Why? What is the source of the distinction between the necessary and the contingent? What's so special about the necessary truths that account for their necessity? In this article, we look at some of the most promising accounts of the grounds of necessity: David Lewis' reduction of necessity to truth at all possible worlds; Kit Fine's reduction of necessity to essence; and accounts of necessity that take the distinction between the necessary and the contingent to be a matter of convention.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00296.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
Kit Fine (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.

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