Tropes, necessary connections, and non-transferability

Dialectica 60 (2):99–113 (2006)
In this paper I examine whether the Humean denial of necessary connections between wholly distinct contingent existents poses problems for a theory of tropes. In section one I consider the substance-attribute theory of tropes. I distinguish first between three versions of the non-transferability of a trope from the substratum in which it inheres and then between two versions of the denial of necessary connections. I show that the most plausible combination of these views is consistent. In section two I consider an objection to the bundle theory using the Humean doctrine that is advanced by Armstrong, and argue that it is unconvincing. In section three I return to the version of non-transferability that would cause obvious trouble for a substance-attribute theory, and less obvious trouble for a bundle theory. I argue that there is independent reason to reject this principle since, given a perdurantist metaphysic, it does not in fact secure what appeared to be its only benefit: namely that it allows tropes to act as truthmakers. I conclude that there is no objection to trope theory per se on the grounds that it brings commitment to necessary connections.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01050.x
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jessica M. Wilson (2010). What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.
Jessica Wilson (2010). What is Hume’s Dictum, and Why Believe It? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595-637.

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