The Ontology of Aristotle's Final Cause

Apeiron 35 (2):153-79 (2003)
Abstract
Modern philosophy is, for what appear to be good reasons, uniformly hostile to sui generis final causes. And motivated to develop philosophically and scientifically plausible interpretations, scholars have increasingly offered reductivist and eliminitivist accounts of Aristotle's teleological commitment. This trend in contemporary scholarship is misguided. We have strong grounds to believe Aristotle accepted unreduced sui generis teleology, and reductivist and eliminitivist accounts face insurmountable textual and philosophical difficulties. We offer Aristotelians cold comfort by replacing his apparent view with failed accounts. And so we ought to admit Aristotle’s prima facie commitments and deal with — if not accept — the consequences.
Keywords Aristotle  teleology  ontology  four causes  final cause
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Rich Cameron (2010). Aristotle's Teleology. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1096-1106.
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Rich Cameron (2010). Aristotle's Teleology. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1096-1106.
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