Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 26 (3-4):175 - 191 (1974)
|Abstract||The premises that a four foot man is short and that a man one tenth of an inch taller than a short man is also short entail by universal instantiation and "modus ponens" that a seven foot man is short. The negation of the second premise seems to entail there are virtually no borderline cases of short men, While to deny the second premise and its negation conflicts with the principle of bivalence, If not excluded middle. But the paradox can be dissolved without resort to degrees of truth or any non-Classical system of logic. If some true predications can be semantically uncertain in a sense suitable for defining borderline cases, The second premise can be denied without denying the vagueness of "short" or reintroducing a sorites paradox along with higher order borderline cases|
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