David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Midwest Studies in Philosophy 33 (1):107-130 (2009)
Recently, philosophers have discovered that they have a lot to learn from, or at least to ponder about, fiction. Many metaphysicians are attracted to fiction as a model for our talk about purported objects and properties, such as numbers, morality, and possible worlds, without embracing a robust Platonist ontology. In addition, a growing group of philosophers of mind are interested in the implications of our engagement with fiction for our understanding of the mind and emotions: If I don’t believe that Anna Karenina exists, can I really pity her, or hope or desire that she extricate herself from her tragic situation? And why is there no “morality fiction,” analogous to science fiction? I suspect that philosophers have been especially comfortable thinking about fiction because it seems, at least prima facie, to employ the imagination in a way that conforms to a standard model of the mind. Specifically, contemporary philosophers tend to think of imagination as a form of mental pretense. Mental pretense can take two main forms: a cognitive attitude of supposing a set of propositions to be true (make-believe) or else an experiential state of imaging a scenario as if it were before one (imaging). Much of our pretense intertwines the cognitive and experiential modalities, of course. But both share a crucial common feature: all of one’s imaginative effort is invested in pretending that certain contents obtain. In this sense, we can understand imagination as the “offline” simulation of actual beliefs and perceptions (and perhaps other attitudes as well), where we analyze these in the normal way, as states individuated by their attitude and representational content. While I share the burgeoning interest in fiction, I want to suggest that we also have a lot to learn from poetry, and in particular from poetic metaphor. I will argue..
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References found in this work BETA
Kendall L. Walton (1990). Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Harvard University Press.
John R. Searle (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
George Lakoff & Mark Johnson (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh the Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought.
Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (2007). Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Noûs 41 (4):663–685.
Citations of this work BETA
Robyn Carston (2010). Metaphor: Ad Hoc Concepts, Literal Meaning and Mental Images. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):295-321.
Avery Archer (2015). Reconceiving Direction of Fit. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):171-180.
Nick Riggle (2015). Personal Style and Artistic Style. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):711-731.
Arnon Levy (2012). Models, Fictions, and Realism: Two Packages. Philosophy of Science 79 (5):738-748.
David Hills (forthcoming). The What and the How of Metaphorical Imagining, Part One. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
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