Vagueness: It's only natural
|Abstract||I attempt to accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness with classical logic and bivalence. I hold that for any vague predicate there is a sharp cut-off between the things that satisfy it and the things that don’t; I claim that this is due to the greater naturalness of one of the candidate meanings of that predicate. I extend the view to give an account of arbitrary reference and a solution to Benacerraf problems. I end by exploring the idea that it is ontically indeterminate what the most natural meanings are, and hence ontically indeterminate where the sharp cut-off in a sorites series is.|
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Added to index2009-01-28
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