David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1993)
Epiphenomenalism is a theory concerning the relation between the mental and physical realms, regarded as radically different in nature. The theory holds that only physical states have causal power, and that mental states are completely dependent on them. The mental realm, for epiphenomenalists, is nothing more than a series of conscious states which signify the occurrence of states of the nervous system, but which play no causal role. For example, my feeling sleepy does not cause my yawning — rather, both the feeling and the yawning are effects of an underlying neural state.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Neil Campbell (2001). What Was Huxley's Epiphenomenalism? Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):357-375.
William Seager (2010). Concessionary Dualism and Physicalism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):217-237.
Volker Gadenne (2006). In Defence of Qualia-Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.
William S. Robinson, Epiphenomenalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Brian P. Mclaughlin (2006). Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.
Dwayne Moore (2012). Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying Causes. Dialogue 51 (3):397-418.
Brian P. McLaughlin (1989). Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical. Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135.
Ivar Hannikainen (2010). Questioning the Causal Inheritance Principle. Theoria 25 (3):261-277.
Norman P. Melchert (1986). What's Wrong with Anomalous Monism. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):265-74.
Paul Raymont (2001). Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant? Dialogue 40 (3):509-528.
Amir Horowitz (1999). Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.
Paul Raymont (1999). An Idle Threat: Epiphenomenalism Exposed. Dissertation, University of Toronto
Neil Campbell (2005). Explanatory Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads50 ( #82,235 of 1,792,063 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #80,477 of 1,792,063 )
How can I increase my downloads?