David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoria 75 (1):34-51 (2009)
I argue that the explanatory gap is generated by factors consistent with the view that qualia are physical properties. I begin by considering the most plausible current approach to this issue based on recent work by Valerie Hardcastle and Clyde Hardin. Although their account of the source of the explanatory gap and our potential to close it is attractive, I argue that it is too speculative and philosophically problematic. I then argue that the explanatory gap should not concern physicalists because it makes excessive demands on physical theory.
|Keywords||qualia physicalism mental anomalism consciousness explanatory gap explanation|
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References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
David J. Chalmers (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
Jaegwon Kim (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Nicholas Unwin (2011). Why Do Colours Look the Way They Do?: Nicholas Unwin. Philosophy 86 (3):405-424.
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