Why we should lower our expectations about the explanatory gap

Theoria 75 (1):34-51 (2009)
Abstract
I argue that the explanatory gap is generated by factors consistent with the view that qualia are physical properties. I begin by considering the most plausible current approach to this issue based on recent work by Valerie Hardcastle and Clyde Hardin. Although their account of the source of the explanatory gap and our potential to close it is attractive, I argue that it is too speculative and philosophically problematic. I then argue that the explanatory gap should not concern physicalists because it makes excessive demands on physical theory.
Keywords qualia  physicalism  mental anomalism  consciousness  explanatory gap  explanation
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1980). Are Absent Qualia Impossible? Philosophical Review 89 (2):257-74.
David J. Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Consciousness and Emotion in Cognitive Science: Conceptual and Empirical Issues 2 (3):200-19.

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