Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):397-422 (2006)
|Abstract||A semantics is presented for belief revision in the face of common announcements to a group of agents that have beliefs about each other’s beliefs. The semantics is based on the idea that possible worlds can be viewed as having an internal-structure, representing the belief independent features of the world, and the respective belief states of the agents in a modular fashion. Modularity guarantees that changing one aspect of the world (a belief independent feature or a belief state) has no effect on any other aspect of the world. This allows us to employ an AGM-style selection function to represent revision. The semantics is given a complete axiomatisation (identical to the axiomatisation found by Gerbrandy and Groeneveld for a semantics based on non-wellfounded set theory) for the special case of expansion.|
|Keywords||common announcements dynamic logic epistemic logic common knoweledge belief revision|
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